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COMMENT
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: A ONE-WAY
TICKET TO THE U.S.... OR IS IT?
A treaty is an agreement or contract between two or more sovereigns or
nations,1 signed and ratified by the states' lawmaking authorities.2 In the
United States, the President has the power "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur."3 The United States Constitution declares that a treaty is
the law of the land,4 and a treaty is regarded by the courts as equivalent to a
statute. 5 If a treaty and a statute are inconsistent, the last in time will pre-
vail.6 Treaties are also a source of international law and bind the signatory
parties to carry out their obligations.7
Extradition is a formal process through which a person is surrendered by
one state to another by virtue of a treaty.' The person surrendered is usually
a fugitive from justice wanted for prosecution or sentencing in the requesting
country for a crime committed there. States are anxious to form extradition
treaties because without them there is no general duty to surrender a fugi-
tive.9 Extradition treaties, however, may not always offer a solution. Most
1. The terms "country," "nation," and "state" are used interchangeably. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 521,
1505, 2228 (Philip B. Gove ed. 1981).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
5. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DE-
MOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (1990).
6. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 64; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888);
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 233 (1990) (quoting The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 616, 620-21 (1871)); see, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
597-99 (1884).
7. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 62. Treaties are either self-executing or non self-executing.
A self-executing treaty requires no legislation to make it operative. It has the force and effect
of legislation. A non self-executing treaty can only be enforced pursuant to implementing
legislation. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
8. 6 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1968).
9. Id.; 4 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1942).
As of January 1, 1990 the countries with which the United States has an extradition treaty
are Albania, Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bo-
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contain a provision that allows the contracting states to refuse to extradite
their own nationals. 1O In such a case, if a foreigner commits a crime in the
United States and then flees to his homeland, he may not be available for
prosecution in the United States. As a result of hindrances on law enforce-
ment, nations sometimes resort to abducting" fugitives from foreign states
and returning them to prosecuting states as an alternate form of rendition.
Because international narcotic trafficking and terrorist activities are ex-
panding,12 the incentive for governments to participate in this alternate form
of rendition is rapidly increasing. The abduction of fugitives raises a variety
of due process and sovereignty issues which remain unsettled by courts
today. 13
Although the use of an alternate method is sometimes necessary, it re-
mains unclear whether abduction is a legal method for bringing a criminal to
justice. One issue is whether the participation by United States officials or
their agents, in the abduction of a fugitive from justice, violates that fugi-
tive's right to due process of law. Most courts have held that the use of an
alternate method of rendition does not, in itself, violate a defendant's due
process rights.' 4 Still, such a method raises questions regarding United
States laws.
livia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, El Sal-
vador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, West Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Ja-
pan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Ma-
rino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. TREATY
AFFAIRS STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 1-274 (1990). (At the time of this
book's release, East and West Germany had not yet been united into a single Germany).
10. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059; Extradi-
tion Treaty, March 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 892; Extradition Treaty, May 25, 1904,
U.S.-Pan., 34 Stat. 2851.
11. "Abduct" means to carry (a person) off by force. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 3 (Philip B. Gove ed.
1981).
12. Martin Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly Developing International Stan-
dard, 14 AKRON L. REV. 27 (1980); TERRORIST RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CENTER, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1990).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 24-42, 74-75.
14. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952); Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 271 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
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A more complex issue is whether these actions violate international law or
the foreign nation's sovereignty. Many courts have held that if a foreign
government aids in or acquiesces to the action, abduction does not violate
the nation's sovereignty.15 When a government unilaterally abducts a fugi-
tive abroad and the foreign government objects, however, a violation of in-
ternational law and of the foreign nation's sovereignty has occurred. 6
Courts and scholars are divided in opinion on what should be the result of
these violations. Some argue that such a violation automatically requires a
court to divest itself of jurisdiction and release the defendant. 17 Others con-
tend that case law has firmly established the principle that the manner in
which a defendant is brought to court is for the most part irrelevant, and
thus any objection to jurisdiction is without merit."8 They further argue that
any objection to the action by the foreign government should be dealt with
by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government,
rather than by the judicial branch, 9 because the United States Constitution
delegates the foreign affairs power to the President and the Congress.2°
This Comment argues that, based on precedent, when United States offi-
cials kidnap a fugitive from a foreign country and bring him to the United
States for prosecution, a court's jurisdiction to hear the case is not affected if
the foreign sovereign objects to the action. First, this Comment surveys case
law establishing that the abduction of a fugitive by law enforcement officials
does not violate his right to due process of law under the United States Con-
stitution. It next examines whether bypassing an extradition treaty and us-
ing alternate forms of rendition violates that extradition treaty. Further, this
(1977); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946
(1975); United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936
(1973); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561, 561 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. 599, 605-06 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
15. See M. CHERIF BASSiOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: U.S. LAW AND PRAC-
TICE ch. V, § 2-9 (1983). Territorial sovereignty is the authority a state exercises over its own
territory. N.A. MARYAN GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (3d ed. 1987). Every state has
the right to exercise jurisdiction within its borders and make decisions regarding internal and
external affairs without interference by other states. ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD
200 (1986).
16. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, ch. V, §§ 2-7 to 2-8; 2 JOHN B. MOORE, A DI-
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (1906) (quoting Letter from Monroe, Secretary of State,
to Anthony St. John Baker (Dec. 6, 1815)).
17. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599; BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, ch. V, §§ 5-31 to 5-34.
18. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
19. See Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700,705 (1888); WHITEMAN,supra note 8, at 1113-14.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Comment addresses the issues raised as a result of a unilateral government
abduction of a defendant from a foreign sovereign's territory. It examines
recent cases which diverge from prior case law by holding that extradition
treaties were violated because the foreign governments objected to the ab-
duction of fugitives from their territory and that the remedy for these viola-
tions was to release the defendants. This Comment concludes that based on
prior court decisions, a court has jurisdiction to try a defendant who was
abducted from a foreign country by law enforcement officials. If the foreign
government objects and requests the return of the defendant, then that raises
separate and distinct issues involving diplomatic relations which are areas
properly addressed by the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment, not by the judicial branch.
I. DUE PROCESS?
A. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A License to Kidnap
More than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Ker v.
Illinois21 that a defendant's right to due process2 2 is not violated if he is
brought before a court by an irregular method, such as abduction.2" In Ker,
a defendant charged with larceny and embezzlement in Illinois fled to Peru.
According to the terms of a treaty between the United States and Peru, for-
mal extradition proceedings were instituted to return Ker to the United
States.24 Upon direction to retrieve Ker, an American agent was given a
warrant to present to the Peruvian authorities.25 Instead of presenting the
papers to the foreign authorities, the agent kidnapped Ker and brought him
back to the United States.26 Ker was tried and convicted for larceny, and
the conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.27 On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, Ker claimed that the abduction in Peru
and his subsequent delivery back to the United States authorities violated
"due process of law." 28 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the
21. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
22. The Court assumed reference to the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, which provides in part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
24. Id. at 438.
25. Id.
26. Id. At that time Peru was engaged in the War of the Pacific and the capital was under
occupation by Chilean forces. The agent, therefore, could not present his papers to the Peru-
vian authorities. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 462 n.85 (1990).




guarantee to due process of law is satisfied when the defendant is indicted by
the grand jury and has a fair trial in which he is not deprived of the rights to
which he is lawfully entitled.29 The Court further noted that a defendant
should not be permitted to avoid answering for a crime because of "mere
irregularities" in the manner in which he was apprehended.3 ° Because no
positive provision of the Constitution or United States laws was violated in
returning Ker to the Court's jurisdiction, he could not claim that he had
been deprived of due process of law. 31 Thus, the Court affirmed Ker's
conviction.32
Sixty years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Frisbie v.
Collins.33 In Frisbie, Michigan police officers kidnapped the petitioner in
Chicago and brought him back to Michigan, where he was tried and con-
victed for murder.34 He claimed that under the circumstances, his trial and
conviction violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution and the Federal Kidnapping Act.35  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that given the enactment
of the Federal Kidnapping Act, a court could no longer try and convict a
defendant brought before it by force in violation of a federal criminal stat-
ute. 36 The Supreme Court disagreed.37
The Court first addressed the defendant's due process challenge.38 Refin-
ing the Ker holding, the Court stated that due process of law is satisfied
when a defendant is apprised of the charges against him and is tried in ac-
cordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. It found that the Con-
29. Id at 440.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id. at 445.
33. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
34. Id. at 520.
35. Id. The Federal Kidnapping Act, 47 Stat. 326, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988)
states in relevant parts:
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or
carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person ...
when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States;
(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdic-
tion of the United States ... ; or
(4) the person is a foreign official, an internationally protected person, or an
official guest .... shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life.
36. Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 467-68 (6th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
37. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
38. Id.
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stitution does not require a court to allow a convicted person to avoid his
sentence because he was brought to trial against his will. 39 The Court next
declared that the Federal Kidnapping Act prescribes sanctions, none of
which include barring a state from prosecuting a defendant brought to it in
violation of the Act. Therefore, even assuming the Michigan officers vio-
lated the Act, the court's jurisdiction over the defendant was not affected.40
The rule that a court's jurisdiction is not affected by the manner in which a
defendant is brought to justice was sustained in subsequent cases, 41 and has
become known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.42
B. The Attempt to Narrow Ker-Frisbie
1. United States v. Toscanino: The Second Circuit Offers Protection
In 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at-
tempted to restrict the broad jurisdictional basis established in Ker and Fris-
bie. In United States v. Toscanino,4 a Toscanino, an Italian citizen, claimed
he had been lured from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay, by a telephone
call placed by or at the direction of a member of the Montevideon police,
acting as a United States agent." He further contended that he was knocked
unconscious, driven to Brazil, and turned over to the authorities in that
country.45 After seventeen days of alleged torture,46 he was brought to the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 522-23.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 485 (1976); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1530
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 309
(9th Cir. 1980); Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 214-15 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 941 (1981); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495, 495 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 271 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States
v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v.
Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); United States ex
rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 64-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United
States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744,
748 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454
F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1971); Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
42. The defendants in both Ker and Frisbie were United States citizens. See also Winter,
509 F.2d at 989 (holding that Ker-Frisbie applies to non-resident aliens as well as to United
States citizens).
43. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 269-70.
46. Toscanino alleged that: he was denied sleep and nourishment for days at a time; alco-
hol was flushed into his eyes; fluids were forced up his anal passage; and electrodes were at-
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United States and arrested on a narcotics charge.4 7 The United States gov-
ernment neither affirmed nor denied the allegations, but instead claimed they
were immaterial to the court's power to proceed.4 ' Toscanino fied a motion
to have the court vacate the verdict, dismiss the indictment, and order his
return to Uruguay.4 9 Toscanino contended that because he was abducted by
United States agents, the court unlawfully acquired jurisdiction over him.5 0
Relying on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the district court denied Toscanino's
motion without a hearing,5 1 and he was subsequently convicted.52
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Toscanino's
allegation could be substantiated, and if so, to divest itself of jurisdiction
over him.53 The court based its conclusion on the theory that since the time
of the Frisbie decision, the Supreme Court had expanded the interpretation
of "due process."'5 4 This "new" due process, according to the Second Cir-
cuit, not only guaranteed the accused a fair procedure at trial, but also the
freedom from "unreasonable invasion of [his] constitutional rights," 5 specif-
ically those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 56 The court concluded
that when a defendant is kidnapped, forcibly brought within a court's juris-
diction, and treated as Toscanino had alleged, due process required a court
tached to his earlobes, toes, and genitals, and jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body.
Id. at 270.
47. Id. at 268, 270.
48. Id at 270.
49. Id. at 271.
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id. at 271.
52. Id. at 268.
53. Id. at 275, 281.
54. Id. at 272. The court based this theory on two Supreme Court cases, Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Rochin, a case actu-
ally decided before Frisbie, the Supreme Court set aside a conviction which rested on evidence
obtained through police misconduct. The extent of the misconduct "shocked the conscience"
of the Court. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73. In Mapp, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
the exclusionary rule to apply to state court proceedings, as well as federal court proceedings.
The exclusionary rule, first articulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), pro-
vides that evidence obtained by officers through an illegal search or seizure cannot be admitted
in a criminal trial of the person from whom it was seized. Its purpose is to deter police miscon-
duct by excluding the "fruit" gained from an illegal act. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267, 272-73.
55. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
56. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part that "people [have the
right] to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person.57 Subsequent judicial opinions
would narrow the Toscanino holding.58
2. The Second Circuit Retreats From Toscanino: United States ex rel.
Lujan v. Gengler
Only months after the Second Circuit declined to rehear Toscanino en
banc,59 it substantially narrowed that decision in United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler.6° In Lujan, the defendant was abducted in a foreign country and
brought to the United States to face prosecution for a narcotics violation.6,
Lujan attacked the court's jurisdiction over his person based upon the man-
ner in which he was apprehended. 62 The district court dismissed Lujan's
petition without a hearing.63
On appeal, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
never disavowed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and stressed that it in no way in-
tended to eviscerate that doctrine in Toscanino.64 The court noted that an
irregularity in the manner of rendition did not, by itself, require a court to
divest itself of jurisdiction.65 In fact, the court stated that absent a set of
facts analogous to those alleged in Toscanino, the "expanded scope of due
process" does not require nullification of an indictment where the defendant
was brought before the court by illegal means.66 The court concluded that
the conduct of which Lujan complained67 did not "shock the conscience,"
57. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. It is interesting to note that on remand, the district court
held that United States officials had not participated in the alleged forcible abduction and
torture of the defendant. The court found it unnecessary to divest itself of jurisdiction over
Toscanino. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975). For a discussion of Toscanino, see Note, International Abduction of Criminal Defend-
ants: Overreaching by the Long Arm of the Law, United States v. Toscanino, United States ex
rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1976); Peter J. Corcoran, Note, Apprehension
Abroad of Alien Criminal Defendant In Violation of Fourth Amendment Ousts Trial Court of
Jurisdiction To Hear Charges-Second Circuit Restricts Ker-Frisbie Rule, 43 FORDHAM L. RE-
VIEW 634 (1975).
59. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267.
60. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
61. Id. at 63.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 64.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 66.
67. Lujan alleged he had been hired to fly a man, who later turned out to be a paid agent
of the United States, from Argentina to Bolivia. When Lujan landed, he was taken into cus-
tody by the Bolivian police, who were also paid agents of the United States, and was trans-
[Vol. 41:149
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and therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. The court upheld its juris-
diction over Lujan.6 s
To date, no court has found any government conduct so egregious as to
require a court to divest itself of jurisdiction.69 In fact, various courts have
rejected the reasoning articulated in Toscanino.7 ° Many courts have also
reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, holding that a defendant's right to due
process is not violated if he is brought into the jurisdiction by irregular
means.
71
II. EXTRADITION TREATIES AND OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED
ABDUCTIONS: CAN THEY BE RECONCILED?
The manner in which an accused is brought to the prosecuting jurisdiction
may be, for the most part, irrelevant in determining compliance with due
process requirements, but it may be relevant to other issues. For instance,
the United States has entered into bilateral extradition treaties with many
countries around the world.72 Through these treaties the contracting states
have a legal right to demand and a duty to surrender persons found within
ported by them to the United States. Lujan was arrested once he was inside United States
territory. Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 66. The Second Circuit reinforced its retreat from Toscanino in United States v.
Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975). In Lira, the court noted that unless a defendant's presence is
secured through the use of "cruel and inhuman conduct," a court need not automatically
divest itself of jurisdiction when the defendant has been abducted by United States representa-
tives. Id. at 70.
69. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
209 (1990).
70. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (holding that "[the defendant] is
not himself a suppressible 'fruit,' and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Govern-
ment of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly un-
tainted by the police misconduct"); Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 261 (noting that the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits have rejected Toscanino and that "Toscanino is of ambiguous constitu-
tional origins. On its face, [it] purports to rely on the due process clause ... [y]et the Second
Circuit relied for support on Mapp v. Ohio, a fourth amendment exclusionary rule case."
(citation omitted)); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 272 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (noting that the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have rejected Tos-
canino); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (discounting the Tos-
canino exception); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir.) (holding that Mapp
does not preclude trial of the accused if he was kidnapped), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973);
Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1964) (holding that Mapp does not impel or
even encourage the court to overrule Frisbie).
71. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1979); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d
255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605-06 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 857 (1992).
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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their territory wanted for prosecution of crimes committed in the other con-
tracting state.73 Extradition treaties generally provide the procedures and
circumstances under which an accused is to be transferred to the requesting
country. When the procedures in an extradition treaty are bypassed and a
fugitive is returned to the prosecuting country by irregular means of rendi-
tion, a controversy arises as to whether that action is a violation of either the
treaty or the foreign nation's sovereignty.74 The answer may depend upon
the specific terms of the treaty and whether the foreign state aids in, or ac-
quiesces to, the action.7  A more difficult issue to resolve, however, is
whether a court must divest itself of jurisdiction over the defendant if the
treaty has been violated. The prevailing view is that limiting a court's juris-
diction based on an extradition treaty first requires a review of the treaty in
question.
A. Extradition Treaty Limits on Alternate Forms of Rendition
Some scholars suggest that an extradition treaty limits the manner in
which a fugitive may be returned to the prosecuting state.76 This belief,
however, is derived from the misinterpretation of a Supreme Court case,
Ford v. United States. 7 Ford does not support the view that every United
States extradition treaty limits the method of rendition of a person to the
procedures prescribed in the treaty.
Ford involved a treaty between the United States and Great Britain."
The treaty empowered the United States to board and search British vessels
found outside the territorial waters of the United States, its territories or
possessions, but within a specified limit.79 The treaty provided that if rea-
sonable cause existed to believe the crew of the vessel was violating United
States prohibition laws, the United States authorities could seize the vessel
and take it to port.80
73. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 727-28; HACKWORTH, supra note 9, at 33.
74. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 89-92, 101-11 and accompanying text.
76. See, Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought
from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Compartive [sic] Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427, 428-29
(1957).
77. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
78. Id. at 600.
79. Id. at 607-08. The treaty specified that a vessel could only be seized if it was within
one hour's travel time from the coast of the United States, its territories or possessions. Con-
vention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
art. II, 43 Stat. 1761, 1762.
80. Ford, 273 U.S. at 608.
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In Ford, the United States Coast Guard stopped a British steamer and
discovered sacks of liquor aboard.8 1 The crew was arrested and the steamer
was towed into port. 2 The defendants claimed that the vessel was not
seized in accordance with the treaty.8 3 The government contended that the
issue was irrelevant to the proceedings because, under Ker, the Court had
jurisdiction over the defendants even if the seizure was illegal.8 4
The Court refused to apply Ker, because in Ker neither the United States
Constitution, a federal law, nor a treaty was violated; therefore, the validity
of the trial after seizure of defendant Ker "was not a matter of federal cogni-
zance."8 5 In contrast, the Ford Court noted, the treaty involved set specific
limitations upon the power of the United States to seize British vessels.8 6
The Court concluded that, unlike Ker, the use of any alternate procedures in
Ford would directly violate a provision of the treaty." The conviction in
Ford was ultimately sustained on other grounds.88
81. The National Prohibition Act prohibited the importation of liquor. Id. at 618.
82. Id. at 603. The members of the crew were charged with conspiracy to violate the
prohibition laws by importing liquor. Id. at 601.
83. The defendants also claimed that the issue should have been submitted to a jury. Id.
at 605. The issue had been decided by the district court. United States v. Ford, 3 F.2d 643,
648 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
84. Ford, 273 U.S. at 605.
85. Id. at 605-06.
86. Id. at 608; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 606.
88. The Court stated that the question of whether the vessel was seized within the limits
prescribed by the treaty did not affect the defendants' guilt or innocence, but only affected the
question of jurisdiction. Id. Since a plea to jurisdiction must be filed before a plea of not
guilty, and that had not been done, the effect was to waive the jurisdictional issue. Id.
The defendants also contended that the treaty expressly provided for the boarding, seizure
and disposition of the vessel, but did not expressly provide for the prosecution of persons on
board. Because of this omission, they argued, the treaty precluded their prosecution. Id. at
607. The defendants based this claim on the maxim of statutory interpretation expressio unius
est exclusio alteriu& Id. at 611. The maxim means "the expression of one thing is the exclu-
sion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). The Court rejected this
argument and interpreted the treaty as providing an implicit grant of jurisdiction over the
offenders found on the vessels. Ford, 273 U.S. at 610; see also John M. Rogers, Prosecuting
Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 447, 458 (1987). The defendants would be immune from prosecution only if
the treaty affirmatively granted them such a right. Ford, 273 U.S. at 611.
The same treaty involved in Ford was involved in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933). In Cook, a British vessel carrying liquor in violation of United States laws was seized
by United States officials and brought into port. Id. at 107-08. The vessel was seized outside
the territorial limits prescribed by the treaty. Id. The Court held the United States lacked the
power to seize the ship and dismissed the charges. Id. at 121-22.
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Ford should not be interpreted as holding that every United States extradi-
tion treaty acts to limit the jurisdiction of the courts.8 9 The violation dis-
cussed in Ford was of a "positive provision" of the treaty.90 The treaty
contained a provision specifically limiting the manner and the place in which
United States officials could board British ships.9 ' Most extradition treaties
do not contain such specific limits on the manner of rendition.92 Therefore,
suggestions that extradition treaties limit a court's jurisdiction must occur
only after reviewing the specific treaty.
B. Extraordinary Rendition
A court's jurisdiction also may not be affected if the prosecuting and asy-
lum governments decide not to formally extradite a defendant, but rather to
effectuate his return by alternate means.93 This is sometimes necessary
where the offense committed is not provided for in the extradition treaty. In
such a case, formal extradition is not possible.94 Even if an extradition
treaty exists and covers the crime in question, because it is for the benefit of
89. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979);
See Rogers, supra note 88, at 460. Cook also should not be viewed as holding that every
United States extradition treaty acts to limit the courts' jurisdiction. Note, A Federal Court
Lacks Jurisdiction Over a Criminal Defendant Brought Into the District by Forcible Abduction;
The Fourth Amendment Protects an Alien Residing Abroad Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures Conducted by American Agents, 88 HARV. L. REv. 813, 820-21 (1975).
90. United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975). The provision of the treaty involved states: "The rights conferred by this article shall
not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the United States ... than can be
traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense." Ford, 273
U.S. at 608.
91. Ford, 273 U.S. at 607-08.
92. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (holding that a
treaty does not limit the ability of the contractive states to surrender fugitives by comity), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981)
(holding that the extradition treaties in question do not mandate that the countries involved
follow the enumerated procedures, and that states may return defendants outside the formal
extradition procedures); Ex Parte Foss, 36 P. 669, 670 (Cal. 1894) (holding that a sovereign
has the right to surrender fugitives for crimes other than those specified in the extradition
treaty). But see Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1931) (holding that a defendant
can be sent to another state only in accordance with the treaty provisions governing
extradition).
94. See, e.g., Foss, 36 P. at 670. Such treaties are called the "numerative (list) approach."
Extradition is only possible if the alleged offense is enumerated in the treaty. See, e.g., Extradi-
tion Treaty, June 7, 1934, U.S.-Iraq, 49 Stat. 3380. The other type of extradition treaty is the
"eliminative (no list) approach." Under this type of treaty, extradition is possible for all of-
fenses punishable in both contracting states by some minimum amount of time. See, e.g.,
Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
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the contracting nations, they may agree to avoid the formal proceedings and
engage instead in alternate forms of rendition.
95
1. Comity: Just Between Friends
Comity is the principle under which a government may voluntarily sur-
render a fugitive from justice to the country from which he has fled.96 It is a
"willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of defer-
ence and good will."97 Such voluntary actions do not violate the fugitive's
due process rights,9" and there is no right to be free from prosecution if
returned to the prosecuting country by means other than formal extradi-
tion.99 It is neither a violation of United States domestic law nor a violation
of the foreign state's sovereignty if that state aids in, or acquiesces to, the
action." ° A number of cases have reinforced this proposition.
In United States v. Cordero, ° i the defendants were arrested by Panama-
nian officials in that country. They were flown to Venezuela and then to
Puerto Rico, where they were tried and convicted for narcotics offenses. 102
The procedures used to return the defendants to Puerto Rico were not in
accord with those enumerated in the extradition treaties between the United
States and Panama and between the United States and Venezuela. 103 The
defendants, relying on that fact, claimed their arrest and subsequent return
to the United States violated both extradition treaties. 04 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed, stating that neither treaty
provided that the procedures enumerated therein were the sole means by
which an accused could be transferred from one state to another.i05 The
95. Alternate forms of rendition are possible because an extradition treaty is for the bene-
fit of the contracting states and they may, if they wish, waive their rights under the treaty.
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990);
United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cordero, 668
F.2d 32, 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
96. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 11.3, 163-64 (1895); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
98. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
99. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935-36 (1st Cir. 1948).
100. See supra note 15.
101. 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 35-36.
103. Id. at 37.
104. Id. The defendants also relied on the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
The court found no circumstances analogous to those alleged in Toscanino and refused to
apply the exception. Id. at 36-37.
105. Id. at 37. The court further noted that the treaties did not prohibit a nation from
deporting an accused. Id. The court also recognized that the contracting government, not the
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First Circuit refused to hold that extradition treaties forbid independent
states from returning an accused by alternate means.l16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated a
similar view in United States v. Valot. 10 7 In Valot, the defendant was ar-
rested and incarcerated in Thailand on a marijuana charge.' 08 On the day
he was released from incarceration, Thai officials detained the defendant un-
til they were able to turn him over to United States officials in Thailand, who
then returned him to the United States." ° Valot argued his "abduction"
violated the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States."o
The court dismissed this claim and stated that there was nothing to stop
Thai authorities from deporting the defendant."'
2. True Abduction
When government officials abduct a fugitive from a foreign state without
the express consent of the foreign government, that government will either
acquiesce or object to the action. 112 If the government acquiesces to the
action, the court's inquiry into the method of rendition ends, barring any
due process concerns." 3 Absent protest from the foreign government, the
abducted individual does not have standing to claim that either a state's sov-
ereignty or an extradition treaty was violated.' This is because it is within
defendant, has the right under international law to complain about an alleged treaty violation.
Id. at 38.
106. The court acknowledged that under such restrictions, extradition treaties would hin-
der, rather than help, states return fugitives. Id. at 38.
107. 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 309.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 310.
111. Id. The court also noted that the defendant did not have standing under international
law to raise the issue of a possible treaty violation. Id.
112. For cases in which a government has acquiesced to the alleged abduction of an ac-
cused from its territory, see Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919
(1987); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Insull, 8
F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1934); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015, 1017 (W.D. Wash.
1924), aff'd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566
(1925). For cases in which a government has protested the alleged abduction, see Mahon v.
Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 704 (1888); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857
(1992); Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
113. See supra note 71.
114. Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 259; Kaufman, 874 F.2d at 243; United States v.
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st
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the state's province to determine whether such violations have occurred and
whether the alleged violations require redress. 115
If the offended government does protest the abduction, either in terms of a
violation of its sovereignty or of the existence of a bypassed extradition
treaty, it will usually do so by means of a diplomatic note sent to the abduct-
ing government.1 6 From that point, courts have disagreed as to whether a
court must divest itself of jurisdiction over the person and as to who should
properly address the foreign government's concerns.' 17
a. Jurisdiction of Courts Over Defendants Seized in Violation of
United States or International Law
Many courts have held that, due process issues aside, an illegal arrest, in
itself, will not bar prosecution.118 In Autry v. Wiley,"19 the defendant, a
United States Naval Reserve member, was court martialed and convicted of
deserting his ship while docked in Canada.12 ° The defendant appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, claiming that the cir-
cumstances under which he was brought from Canada to the United States
Cir. 1981); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67;
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 607; Garcia-Mora, supra note 76, at 436.
Some courts have held that once the offended government formally protests, the abducted
individual has derivative standing to raise the issue and invoke rights under the treaty.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1355-57; Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608.
115. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Zabaneh, 837 F.2d at 1261; Lujan,
510 F.2d at 67.
116. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1343; Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608.
117. For cases in which courts have referred the matter to the political branches of the
government, see Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310
(N.D. Ill. 1934); Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934); United States v. Unverzagt,
299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), aff'd sub nor. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925). For cases in which courts have declared the matter within judi-
cial cognizance, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
A threshold issue is whether the abduction was perpetrated by officials of the prosecuting
state or its paid agents, or by individuals acting of their own accord. If the abductors were
bona fide volunteers, then a state cannot be accused of violating another state's sovereignty.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at ch. V, § 2-7; Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected
in Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265, 269 (1952); Michael H. Car-
dozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction The Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 132 (1961).
If the abductors were agents of the prosecuting government, however, that government is held
responsible. A government agent is an individual who is vested with the government's author-
ity. His acts are considered those of the state. CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (1928).
118. See cases cited infra note 138.
119. 440 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1971).
120. Id. at 800.
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violated a treaty and that jurisdiction therefore could not be asserted over
him.121 He based this assertion on United States v. Rauscher,'22 which es-
tablished that a defendant who is extradited for one crime may not be tried
for a different crime once inside the prosecuting state. 1 23 The defendant also
relied on Cook v. United States,1 24 which established that if the terms of a
treaty set specific territorial limits, a defendant seized outside those limits
may not be prosecuted.1 25
The Autry court relied on Ker as establishing the general rule that the
manner in which an accused is brought before a court is immaterial. The
court further stated that Rauscher and Cook provide very limited exceptions
to the general rule and that neither applied in the case at bar.1 26
This interpretation of jurisdictional limitations was reaffirmed in United
States v. Noriega. 27 In Noriega, a federal grand jury indicted Noriega 121 for
"participating in an international conspiracy to import cocaine and materials
used in producing cocaine into and out of the United States." '129 Relations
between the United States and Panama deteriorated to the point that in De-
cember of 1989, Noriega declared the existence of a state of war between the
two countries.1 30  Subsequently, Panamanian troops shot and killed an
American soldier, wounded another American soldier, and assaulted a Navy
couple.13' United States President Bush responded by sending United States
troops into Panama City. 132 The troops were to seize Noriega and return
him to the United States to face prosecution. 133 Two weeks later, Noriega
surrendered to the United States.134
121. Id.
122. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
123. Id. at 430.
124. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
125. Id. at 121.
126. 440 F.2d at 801-02.
127. 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
128. General Manuel Antonio Noriega was the leader of the Panamanian armed forces.
Id. at 1509-10. Also indicted was Lt. Col. Luis Del Cid. Id.
129. Id. at 1510.
130. Id. at 1511.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The troops were also sent in to "safeguard American lives, restore democracy,
[and] preserve the Panama Canal treaties." Id. Before the action, Guillermo Endara was
sworn in as president of Panama. Endara had won the presidential election held in Panama
months earlier, but Noriega disregarded the election results. Id.




Noriega claimed that the invasion of Panama violated international trea-
ties. "'3 5 Although the court dismissed this claim on other grounds,'3 6 it
noted that based on Ker-Frisbie, violations of international law, such as trea-
ties, do not require a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over a defendant.
The court recognized that its jurisdiction would only be affected if the trea-
ties at issue included terms which expressly limited that jurisdiction.' 37 A
number of cases have expressed the same line of reasoning
38
b. Diplomacy: The Executive's Exclusive Sphere
Although a court retains jurisdiction over a defendant brought before it in
violation of a United States or international law, the issue of how to address
the offended government's protest remains. Governments communicate
with each other through diplomatic channels. Therefore, an official protest
from the offended government will be presented through such channels. '
39
In the United States, diplomatic issues are handled by the executive branch;
specifically, communication passes through the Department of State.'"
From this point, courts have differed as to whether the matter should be
resolved by the judiciary' 4 ' or the political branches of the government. 142
135. Specifically, Noriega claimed the United Nations Charter, article 2, paragraph 4, and
the Organization of American States Charter, article 17, were violated. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
at 1532. For a discussion of claims under these charters see infra note 185.
136. The court determined that Noriega did not have standing to assert the violations. It
based this conclusion on the fact that offended nations, not individuals, have standing to assert
a violation of international treaties. Id. at 1533. Noriega was not considered by the court to be
the leader of the nation of Panama. The court noted that the United States has never recog-
nized the Noriega regime as Panama's government and that the present government did not
object. Id. at 1534.
137. Id. at 1533.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1009 (1986); United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, Number 28, SOI 600, 395 F. Supp. 413,
418-19 (D. Me. 1975). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1354-55
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606-14 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
139. HACKWORTH, supra note 9, at 604 (quoting Letter from Secretary Bacon to Norwe-
gian Minister Gude (Dec. 11, 1908)).
140. Id. There are a few instances in which communication may not need to go through
the State Department. See id. at 606.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
142. See. e.g., Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889); United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d
520 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.
Ill. 1934); Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F.
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Traditionally, the President has been considered responsible for con-
ducting the United States' foreign affairs143 and for conducting general nego-
tiations with foreign governments.'" The President negotiates treaties 145
and represents the United States to foreign nations.' 46 In part, this is due to
the fact that the executive may be privy to relevant information to which the
judiciary is not."47 "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its exter-
nal relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' 48 As a re-
suit, executive decisions which must be made in dealing with foreign
governments are of a political, rather than judicial, nature. 149 Many courts
have conformed their decisions to these principles.' 50
In Mahon v. Justice,'' the defendant was wanted in Kentucky for mur-
der. He was forcibly abducted from West Virginia, where he had fled. 152
The Governor of West Virginia demanded the release and return of Mahon,
but the Governor of Kentucky refused. 153 The Governor of West Virginia
petitioned the Court for the defendant's release. 15 4
The Court held that the jurisdiction of a court over a defendant is not
affected by the manner in which the defendant is returned.'55 One of the
cases the Court relied upon to reach its conclusion not only ruled that juris-
diction was unaffected by such action, but also that if the foreign country
1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925).
143. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-21 (1936).
144. HACKWORTH, supra note 9, at 650 (quoting SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES,
THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 108 (2d ed. 1916)).
145. Although the President makes treaties by and with the consent of two-thirds of the
Senators present, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, he alone negotiates. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S.
at 319.
146. Id. at 319-20.
147. Id. at 320; Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
148. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting address by Marshall, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives 6th Congress (Feb. 15, 1816)).
The importance of the United States speaking with a unitary voice was also recognized by
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in its report to the Senate in 1816. Part of the
report provided that "[t]he President is the constitutional representative of the United States
with regard to foreign nations .... [He is the] most competent to determine when, how, and
upon what subjects negotiation may be urged .... The nature of transactions with foreign
nations, moreover, requires ... unity of design .. " Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting
United States Senate Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24 (Feb. 15, 1816)).
149. Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111.
150. See infra notes 151-85 and accompanying text.
151. 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
152. Id. at 700-01.
153. Id. at 703.
154. Id. at 700.
155. Id. at 708, 715.
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from which the defendant was abducted complains, the matter should be
referred to the political branches, because the court is not empowered under
the Constitution to enter into political relations.'5 6 Mahon's conviction was
affirmed.' 57 The following year, the Supreme Court held in The Chinese
Exclusion Case15 that it is not within the power of the judiciary to pass
upon the legitimacy of a decision by the government to disregard a treaty
with a foreign sovereign.' 59
Of the many cases decided in accord with the above stated opinions,
160
four are particularly noteworthy. The first is United States v. Unverzagt,161
in which the defendant was abducted from British Columbia and brought to
the United States.' 62 The defendant argued that he could not be removed
from British Columbia without that government's consent and that he
should be released because he was unlawfully brought before the court. The
Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington found that
there was no question as to the validity of the indictment, or as to whether
the defendant was the person named in the indictment, and denied the de-
fendant's writ for discharge. 163 It noted that if either Canada or British Co-
156. Id. at 711-12. The Court relied on State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
157. Mahon, 127 U.S. at 715. But see Garcia-Mora, supra note 76, at 438 (explaining that
the abduction of a fugitive is a matter for judicial inquiry and should not be transferred to the
domain of politics).
158. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
159. Id. at 602.
160. A few examples of such cases are as follows:
In 1905, Antonio Martinez was kidnapped from Mexico and returned to the United States
to stand trial in California. At the Mexican Government's request, the United States extra-
dited Martinez's kidnapper to Mexico for prosecution. The Mexican Government also re-
quested the return of Martinez on the grounds that he was brought to the United States by
unlawful means. The request was sent to the U.S. State Department, and it, not the court,
decided the issue. Martinez was not returned to Mexico. 2 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1941).
Adelard Lafond was charged in Canada with larceny. He was allegedly kidnapped from
Illinois and returned to Canada for prosecution. The American Consul requested the Attor-
ney General of Canada to return Lafond to the United States. The judiciary was not involved
in this decision. HACKWORTH, supra note 9, at 224.
In 1849, a Spaniard from Cuba was kidnapped from the United States by the direction of
either the Spanish or Cuban Government. The American Consul was ordered to investigate
the matter, and if it was discovered that either foreign government had been involved, the
matter would be sent to Congress, not the court, to decide on a remedy. 4 JOHN B. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 329 (1906).
161. 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925).
162. 299 F. at 1016.
163. Id.
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lumbia wished to protest, which they did not, the issue would be political
and should be handled through appropriate channels." 64
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned
similarly in United States v. Insull.'65 The defendant was aboard a Greek
vessel in the Bosporus.' 66 He was seized by Turkish police and delivered to
an American vessel anchored in a Turkish port16 7 which transported him to
the United States.'6 The defendant argued that the court did not have juris-
diction over his person, because he was abducted in violation of United
States law and in violation of treaties between the United States and the
Hellenic Republic and between the United States and Turkey.' 69 The court
dismissed that contention by citing Ker and its progeny. 170 It added that the
country from which the defendant was seized had not, at the time of prose-
cution, objected to the action. If it did object, however, the question would
be political and it should be addressed through diplomatic channels-chan-
nels over which the court had no power to examine.
17 1
In Ex Parte Lopez, 172 the defendant was seized in Mexico and brought to
the United States to face prosecution for violation of narcotics laws.' 73 The
Mexican government claimed that the abduction violated its sovereignty and
requested that Lopez be released and returned to Mexico. 17' The Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Texas acknowledged the objec-
tion was a very serious matter, but noted that it was one which should be
handled by the executive, not the judicial branch of the government.' 75 The
court therefore continued with the proceedings against the defendant.
176
164. Id. at 1016-17.
165. 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. I1. 1934).
166. The Bosporus is an eighteen mile straight between Greece and Turkey, which con-
nects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 291 (Int'l. ed.
1965).
167. Insull, 8 F. Supp. at 311.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 312-13 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Unverzagt,
299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925)).
171. Id. at 313.
172. 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
173. Id. at 343.
174. Id.




Finally, in United States v. Sobell, I ' the defendant was involved in espio-
nage against the United States. 7" He fled to Mexico where he was forcibly
abducted and returned to the United States by Mexican Security Police who
were acting as paid agents of the United States. I 79 He was subsequently
convicted of giving United States defense information to the Soviet Union
and five years later petitioned the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York to set aside the verdict and the judgment.' 80 The
defendant claimed that his abduction violated the extradition treaty between
the United States and Mexico and, therefore, that the federal district court
had lacked jurisdiction to proceed against him.'
The court discussed the specific obligations owed by one sovereign to an-
other upon entering into an extradition treaty. 8 2 The surrendering state is
obligated to extradite fugitives for the agreed upon offenses.' 3 The demand-
ing state is obligated to try the fugitive only for the specific crime charged. ' 8 4
If the demanding state bypasses the formalities of the extradition treaty and
recovers a fugitive by alternate means which violate the other state's sover-
eignty, "that creates a question for the political branches of the government,
but does not raise any [questions] concerning judicial jurisdiction."'8 5 The
court denied the defendant's motion.
177. 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
873 (1957).
178. Id at 517.
179. Id at 519.
180. Id at 517-19. Sobell's conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Id. at 519. The Soviet Union was a multinational state organized as a
federation of fifteen union republics. It was formed in 1922 following the Bolshevik revolution
of 1917. 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 379, 380 (Int'l. ed. 1965). On December 8, 1991,
the leaders of three of the republics, Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia, formally announced the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Michael Dobbs, Slavic Republics Declare Soviet Union Liqui-
dated, WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1991, at Al. On December 21, 1991, the leaders of eleven former
Soviet republics announced that the Soviet Union was replaced by a new Commonwealth of
Independent States. James Rupert, Yeltsin to Control Most Nuclear Arms; 11 Former Soviet
Republics Declare Formation of Commonwealth, WASH. PoST, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al.
181. Id
182. Id. at 524.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 524-25.
A defendant may further attempt to challenge a court's jurisdiction based on the alleged
violation of an international obligation. The United Nations Charter is an international agree-
ment, and therefore it is not self-executing. As a result, it does not confer judicially enforcea-
ble rights upon individuals. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374
(7th Cir. 1985). Some defendants who have been returned to a country by means other than
extradition refer to article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, which limits the use of force by one
member state against another, in an attempt to challenge the court's jurisdiction. U.N. CHAR-
TER, article 2, paragraph 4. While this provision imposes obligations on the member nations
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C. A Disturbing Departure
The two most recent opinions released in this area of the law were decided
by federal courts in California. In United States v. Caro-Quintero,186 the
defendant, Dr. Alvarez-Machain, was a Mexican national who was wanted
in the United States to face charges in connection with the torture/murder
of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar. 187 The United States and Mexican Governments
reached an agreement whereby Machain would be returned to the United
States. 188 Unfortunately, the agreement fell apart,"8 9 and Machain was sub-
and the United Nations itself, it does not protect an individual's rights. Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). There-
fore, a defendant's challenge to jurisdiction based on article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter must
fail. Id. If a sovereign state claims that a violation of article 2, paragraph 4 has occurred,
however, in certain situations the state accused of the violation may want to argue that article
51 of the Charter supports its action. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. This article gives states the
right to take steps to protect its territory and citizens if "an armed attack occurs." Id. There
are some states that allow terrorist groups to use their territory to train and plan terrorist
attacks on other countries. These actions could constitute an armed attack and, based on
Article 51, would allow the prosecuting state to use force in "self-defense." Id. The force used
would be abducting the fugitive and bringing him to justice. D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting
Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23
TEX. INT'L L.J. 22 (1988).
Another international obligation relied upon by defendants to attack a court's jurisdiction is
contained in article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Organization of
American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires,
February 27, 1967, art. 17, 21 U.S.T. 607. This article discusses the inviolability of a state.
However, the Charter is not self-executing, and thus does not confer any enforceable rights on
individuals. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809.
One multilateral treaty that does confer rights on individuals is the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December
19, 1966, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 9, which affirms the rights of individuals to liberty
and security of person, best supports the argument that abduction violates internationally pro-
tected human rights. Findlay, supra, at 36. This article is intended to guard against police
abuse. Id. Article 9 may not actually help a defendant's case, however, because it has been
interpreted to require only "that a state have valid grounds to deprive an individual of his or
her liberty and an adequate procedure for detention and trial." Id.
Even in recent times, cases still arise in which a defendant, abducted from one state and
brought to another for prosecution, attacks a court's jurisdiction based on the manner of his
rendition. Id. at 38-39.
186. 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
187. Id. at 601.
188. Id. at 602.
189. The DEA refused to advance Mexican officials $50,000 to cover transportation ex-
penses, and thus Machain was not delivered. Id. at 602. Subsequent negotiations also fell
apart due to increased tension between the Mexican Government and the United States Gov-
ernment, which resulted from the airing of an NBC mini-series based on the Camarena murder
and investigation. Id. at 602-03.
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sequently abducted from Mexico by United States agents and returned to the
United States. 190
The following month, the Embassy of Mexico sent several diplomatic
notes to the United States Department of State alleging United States partic-
ipation in Machain's abduction and stating that the action violated the extra-
dition treaty between the two countries. 9 ' The Mexican government
demanded Machain's return to Mexico and requested the extradition of the
DEA agent and DEA informant who arranged the abduction for prosecu-
tion.' 92 To date, the United States has not complied with this demand.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
followed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine'9 3 and denied Machain's motion to dismiss
on due process grounds.1 94 However, the court held that the United States
action, combined with Mexico's protest, violated the extradition treaty, and
that as a result Machain should be returned to Mexico.' 9 5 In reaching its
decision, the court misinterpreted Ford v. United States'96 and Cook v.
United States'97 as establishing that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply
when "a treaty of the United States is directly involved."' 9' As stated in
prior case law, the Ker doctrine did not apply in Ford and Cook because no
positive provision of the treaty had been violated in Ker. Ford and Cook
only apply when a positive provision of a treaty that limits jurisdiction is
violated. 99 There is no provision in the extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico which specifies that a fugitive may be returned to
the prosecuting country only in accordance with the procedures enumerated
in the treaty. 2° Therefore, in Caro-Quintero, no positive provision of the
extradition treaty was violated. The court should have based its analysis on
Ker, not Ford and Cook.
190. Id. at 603.
191. Id. at 604.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 604. For a discussion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, see supra notes 21-42 and
accompanying text.
194. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 605-06.
195. Id. at 614. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
The court based its decision on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1991). Machain, 946 F.2d at 1466-67. The United States Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari to hear the case. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
196. 273 U.S. 593 (1927); see supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
197. 288 U.S. 102 (1933); see supra note 88.
198. 745 F. Supp. at 606 (quoting Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927)).
199. See cases cited supra note 138.
200. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059. It is interesting to
note that the district court did not cite any provision of the treaty in its decision.
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The court further reasoned that, because the Mexican Government ob-
jected to the abduction, the extradition treaty had been violated. Even if the
action violated the extradition treaty, case law has established that a court's
jurisdiction is not effected in such a situation unless the treaty provides spe-
cific limits. In addition, a diplomatic protest following an abduction should
be handled by the executive and legislative branches of the government, not
by the judicial branch.20
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,2 °2 the defendant was also abducted
from Mexico by United States officials to face prosecution for the murder of
DEA Agent Camarena-Salazar.2 °3 The Mexican Government demanded his
return.2" The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging
that the extradition treaty between the two countries was violated and there-
fore the court must divest itself of jurisdiction.2 °5 The district court dis-
missed the defendant's motion based on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.2°6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the authorized or sponsored abduction of a defendant by the United
States from a foreign sovereign's territory, without the consent or acquies-
cence of that government, violates the extradition treaty between the two
countries.20 7 Further, if the offended government protests, a court hearing
the case must divest itself of jurisdiction. 208 The court stated that based on
Ford and Cook, a court's jurisdiction is adversely affected if the defendant is
brought before the court by illegal means, especially in violation of a
treaty. 2°9 The treaty involved in both Ford and Cook, however, provided
explicit limits on when the defendants could be seized. No such limits are
provided for in the United States-Mexico extradition treaty.2 0
The Ninth Circuit in Verdugo-Urquidez, as did the district court in Caro-
Quintero, misinterpreted Ford and Cook and combined the jurisdiction issue
with the diplomatic relations issue. Both cases are disturbing in that they
201. See supra notes 139-85 and accompanying text.
202. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
203. See supra text accompanying note 187.
204. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1343.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1342-43.
208. Id. at 1343. The court acknowledged that individuals do not have standing under
international law to raise treaty violation issues, but found that because Mexico objected, the
defendant had derivative standing to raise such an issue. Id. at 1355-57.
209. Id. at 1346-47. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the United States authorized or sponsored Verdugo-Urquidez's kidnapping. Id. at
1343. If the district court so finds, it shall give Verdugo-Urquidez to the Mexican authorities.
Id. at 1360.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
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significantly diverge from one hundred years of precedent in which courts
had refused to limit the method of rendition.
III. THE FUTURE OF OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ABDUCTION
OF FUGITIVES
International terrorist and narcotic activities are rapidly increasing in to-
day's world.2"1 This, in addition to the fact that many states will not extra-
dite their own nationals,212 frustrates law enforcement officials and courts to
the point where alternate forms of rendition become increasingly attractive.
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that a court
maintains jurisdiction over a defendant brought in from overseas by means
other than formal extradition, with or without the offended nation's con-
sent.21 3 Since that time, courts have affirmed and expanded on that deci-
sion.214 It is now well established that a defendant, whether a United States
citizen or an alien, abducted from abroad by the prosecuting state may not
claim that his right to due process has been violated based solely upon that
one factor.21 Consistent with a line of Supreme Court cases,216 the defend-
ant's "due process rights" are afforded to him after his arrest in the pretrial
and trial stages.
A court also maintains its jurisdiction when a defendant is brought before
the court in violation of United States or international law.217 When an
offended government protests the action through diplomatic channels, the
answers are not as clear. What is clear, however, is that the protest does not
affect the court's jurisdiction over the defendant. The issue of jurisdiction is
distinct from the issue of how to deal with the protesting government. Dip-
lomatic relations are within the sphere of the executive and legislative
branches. Only representatives of these branches are familiar with diplo-
matic strategies and are privy to certain facts necessary to plot these strate-
gies.2  A judge is neither equipped nor empowered to make decisions that
will inevitably affect the foreign policy of the United States. 2 9 These powers
are delegated by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature, not to
the judiciary.22 °
211. See supra note 12.
212. See supra note 10.
213. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
214. See cases cited supra note 71.
215. See cases cited supra note 71.
216. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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When deciding whether to return a defendant who has been abducted
abroad by a prosecuting state back to the state from which he was abducted,
the Government should consider the ramifications of its decision. In Caro-
Quintero and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Mexican Government is demanding the
return of the defendants. If that demand is not satisfied, then the coopera-
tion given to the United States by Mexico in its "war on drugs" could be
jeopardized. The United States must also consider what its position would
be if the situation was reversed. Would it silently accept the abduction of
one of its citizens? It has not in the past.221
There may be some situations in which the United States will not want to
extradite an individual. For example, in Caro-Quintero the Mexican Gov-
ernment wants the DEA agent who was indirectly involved in Machain's
abduction extradited to face charges.222 If the United States does not honor
the request and Mexican officials or their paid agents abduct the agent, re-
turn him to Mexico, and try him there, what will the United States do?
Based upon the prior actions of the United States, it may not be in a strong
position to object to Mexico's action and demand the return of the DEA
agent. The United States may not want to set a precedent that it is accepta-
ble to flout international law principles and ignore diplomatic requests from
foreign governments. Because of the potential ramifications of such action,
any decisions made regarding a diplomatic request should be made by the
executive, not by the judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Extradition treaties are executed for the benefit of the contracting states to
protect their respective sovereignty. States may, if they wish, avoid the ex-
tradition treaty and return fugitives by alternate forms of rendition. Some-
times, however, a state acts unilaterally and abducts a fugitive from another
state. If the foreign government acquiesces and does not register a com-
plaint, the fugitive has no recourse. If the foreign country views the action
as a violation of its sovereignty, it has the right under international law to
register a formal protest. Most courts have held, in such cases, that a court
maintains jurisdiction over the fugitive regardless of the violation of any
United States or international law. Complaints about the violation of sover-
eignty or international law are forwarded through the diplomatic channel,
221. See supra note 160, the second and third examples.
222. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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and are best handled by the executive and legislative branches of
government.
Jacqueline A. Weisman

